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Abstract. Prior research has documented a ‘‘kink’’ in the earnings distribution: too few firms report small
losses, too many firms report small profits. We investigate whether boosting of discretionary accruals to
report a small profit is a reasonable explanation for this ‘‘kink.’’ Overall, we are unable to confirm that
boosting of discretionary accruals is the key driver of the kink. We caution the use of the ratio of small
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of alternative explanations for the kink.
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An empirical regularity documented by Hayn (1995) is that there is a ‘‘kink’’ in the
earnings distribution: too few firms report small losses and too many firms report
small profits. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997a) build on Hayn by showing a kink in
both the earnings change and the earnings level distributions and suggesting the
cause of the kink is earnings management.1 However, a closer look at the evidence of
earnings management they provide leaves open the question of whether earnings
management is a complete explanation.
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997a), provide two tests to support the contention that
the kink is driven by earnings management. First, they show an increase in the level
of cash flows around the zero earnings reference point (see their Figure 7), and
suggest that this is consistent with cash flow manipulation to boost earnings
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997a, p. 117). However, given the well-known positive
relation between cash flows and earnings, an increase in cash flows is expected
around the kink. In addition, the traditional view in accounting is that because
accruals contain estimates and forecasts, they are easier to manipulate than cash
flows. If the kink is due to earnings manipulation it would seem reasonable to
assume that managers would use the flexibility offered by accruals to achieve this
goal.
*Corresponding author.
The second test performed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997a), is to investigate
whether accruals are higher around the zero reference point. The results of these tests
are inconsistent and difficult to interpret. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997a), find a
slight increase in the median change in working capital at the zero reference point
(see their Figure 8). This finding by itself is not surprising since there is a well-known
positive relation between working capital accruals and earnings. Burgstahler and
Dichev (1997a), also investigate whether ‘‘other accruals’’ increase for the small
profit group relative to the small loss group. Inconsistent with earnings management,
they find that ‘‘other accruals’’ decrease for the small profit group relative to the
small loss group (see their Figure 9).
Overall, Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997a), strongest result in support of earnings
management is that cash flows increase for the small profit group relative to the
small loss group. However, observing an increase in cash flows could be the result of
firms taking real actions (and employees working harder) to improve firm
performance. Therefore, an alternative explanation for this finding is that it is
easier to motivate employees, set bonuses, and define budgets when there is a clearly
defined goal (i.e., report a profit). Cash flows could improve even in the absence of
earnings management. Without further evidence, it is difficult to interpret the cash
flow finding.
The objective of our paper is to build on Burgstahler and Dichev (1997a), by
reexamining the earnings management explanation. Specifically, we focus on
whether earnings management is a complete or a partial explanation for the kink.
Our tests focus on ‘‘discretionary’’ accruals and we investigate whether small profit
firms have high discretionary accruals relative to two groups: (i) all other firms and
(ii) small loss firms. We use all other firms to determine whether small profit firms
have unusual discretionary accruals relative to the general population. We compare
small profit firms to small loss firms to directly test whether boosting of discretionary
accruals causes the kink.
If earnings management to avoid reporting a loss is the reason for the kink, then
we expect firms that report small profits to have higher discretionary accruals than
small loss firms. The idea here is that by managing earnings up, firms move from
reporting a small loss to a small profit, and this explains the low proportion of firms
in the small loss group and the high proportion of firms in the small profit group.
Firms in the small loss group are predicted to have discretionary accruals similar to
the average firm. Under a simple loss avoidance story, there is no reason why a firm
with a large loss will boost earnings to report a smaller loss. (If this incentive existed
then the loss avoidance story would ‘‘unravel’’ and we would not observe too few
firms reporting small losses.) Firms reporting small losses are therefore not predicted
to be managing earnings in a specific direction. In addition, loss avoidance is a
directional prediction: managers use discretionary accruals to increase earnings to
report a small profit. Therefore, we expect to observe a decline in the kink after
excluding firms with income increasing discretionary accruals from the earnings
distribution.
Our evidence indicates that small profit firms have high discretionary accruals
relative to other firms. This is consistent with small profit firms engaging in earnings
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management, but it is not sufficient evidence to explain the kink. In our tests
comparing small profit firms to small loss firms, we find that both sets of firms (i)
have high discretionary accruals; and (ii) have a similar proportion of positive
discretionary accrual firms. In addition, the kink does not disappear or decline when
we focus on the distribution of firms with income decreasing discretionary accruals.
Since small loss firms have, on average, positive discretionary accruals this suggests
that they also face incentives to boost earnings even though they reported a loss.
Our results are inconsistent with the joint hypothesis that our discretionary
accrual model detects earnings management and that the kink is caused by earnings
management. Thus our lack of findings could either be because (i) the kink is driven
by earnings management but our model lacks the power to identify the earnings
management taking place; or (ii) our model correctly identifies earnings manage-
ment, but boosting of discretionary accruals does not explain the kink.
We address the first explanation that our model lacks power in four ways. (1) We
use a revised model of discretionary accruals that has twice the explanatory power of
the cross-sectional modified Jones model that is commonly used in empirical
research (e.g., DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998). (2) We show that discretionary
accruals are less persistent than other components of earnings. (3) We show that
discretionary accruals detect earnings manipulation identified in SEC enforcement
actions. (4) We show that consistent with earnings being temporarily high, firms with
positive discretionary accruals have lower future earnings and lower future stock
returns (e.g., Sloan, 1996, and Xie, 2001). However, we acknowledge that low power
could still be an explanation and so our lack of findings can be interpreted as
bringing into question the validity of the Jones-type discretionary accrual models.
We also consider the possibility that the second explanation is correct (i.e., that
earnings management does not completely explain the kink). We provide preliminary
evidence on some hypotheses and discuss (but do not test) other explanations. Our
alternative explanations include (i) managers taking real actions to ensure that they
report a profit rather than a loss; (ii) exchange listing requirements having a selection
bias towards profitable firms; (iii) investors applying different valuation methods to
profit versus loss firms and so scaling earnings by market value accentuates the kink;
(iv) accounting rules and conservatism precluding the recording of small losses and
encouraging the recording of small profits; and (v) the market-wide use of financial
assets with return distributions truncated at zero inducing a greater proportion of
small profit firms. Our preliminary evidence on explanations (ii) and (iii) suggest that
selection biases provide a partial explanation and that scaling also influences the
magnitude of the kink.
Finally, we examine whether the kink has changed through time and whether it
continues to be an important empirical regularity. We document that the earnings
kink and the earnings change kink have declined over time, whereas the analyst
forecast error kink has increased. These results suggest a reinterpretation of
Degeorge et al. (1999) claim that the hierarchy of thresholds is first to report a profit,
second to report an increase in profits, and third to meet analysts’ forecasts. Our
results suggest that in more recent years, meeting analysts’ consensus forecasts is
becoming the more important hurdle.
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Based on our findings we suggest that researchers consider the following when
constructing tests of earnings management that use either small profit firms or the
ratio of small profit to small loss firms as a proxy for earnings management. First,
managers can take real actions to avoid reporting a loss and these observations will
add noise to tests of earnings management. Second, we find that small profit firms
differ from firms in the general population in terms of leverage, earnings, and age.
Ignoring these characteristics could result in correlated omitted variable problems.
Finally, our results suggest that small loss firms also appear to boost discretionary
accruals. Without a more complicated loss avoidance story, it is difficult to reconcile
this result with the earnings management explanation for the kink.
Our paper proceeds in three sections. The next section describes our accrual model
and provides some results on the power of this model. Section 2 describes our
sample, provides our predictions, and reports our results. Our conclusions are in
Section 3.
1. Model of Discretionary Accruals
1.1. Modeling Accruals
In this section we extend the Jones model with the objective of producing an accrual
model with higher explanatory power. All models of discretionary accruals can be
criticized for misclassifying nondiscretionary accruals as discretionary. Our objective
is to provide some additional variables that at an intuitive level are expected to vary
with nondiscretionary accruals.
We consider four accrual models, each building on the one before. The first model
is the modified cross-sectional Jones model discussed in Defond and Subramanyam
(1998). The simple Jones (1991) model assumes that the entire change in revenues is
free from managerial discretion. The modified Jones model backs out credit sales
from the change in revenues. The modified Jones model is estimated for each two-
digit SIC-year grouping as follows:
Total Accruals ¼ aþ b1ðDSales DRECÞ þ b2PPE þ e; ð1Þ
where Total Accruals is the difference between operating cash flows (Compustat item
308) and income before extraordinary items (item 123) as reported on the statement
of cash flows. DSales is the change in sales (item 12) from the previous year to the
current year, DREC is the difference in accounts receivable (item 302) from the start
to the end of the year, and PPE is the end of year property, plant and equipment
(item 7). All variables are scaled by average total assets (item 6).
For our second model, we make an adjustment for the expected increase in credit
sales. The modified Jones model assumes all credit sales in each period are
discretionary and induces a positive correlation between discretionary accruals and
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current sales growth. We estimate the following regression for each two-digit SIC-
year grouping:
DREC ¼ aþ kDSalesþ e: ð2aÞ
The slope coefficient ðkÞ from this regression captures the expected change in
accounts receivable for a given change in sales. The median (mean) value for the
slope coefficient is 0.070 (0.068). The maximum value is 0.391 and the minimum
value is 0.2 On average a $100 change in sales will result in a $7 increase in accounts
receivable. The cross-sectional modified Jones model classifies this $7 as
discretionary, whereas our adapted Jones model will classify this as nondiscre-
tionary. Our adapted model includes only the unexpected portion of the change in
accounts receivable in discretionary accruals. So we subtract the full amount of the
change and add back the expected change (which is k multiplied by the change in
sales). This model is estimated for each two-digit SIC-year group as follows:
Total Accruals ¼ aþ b1ðð1þ kÞDSales DRECÞ þ b2PPE þ e: ð2bÞ
Accruals by definition reverse through time and are less persistent than cash flows.
However, some proportion of accruals is predictable based on last year’s accruals.
Similar to Chambers (1999), we include the lagged value of total accruals ðLagTAÞ to
capture the predictable component. We estimate this lagged model as follows:
Total Accruals ¼ aþ b1ðð1þ kÞDSales DRECÞ þ b2PPE þ b3LagTAþ e: ð3Þ
As a final adjustment we include future sales growth in the model. Accruals by
their nature are designed to smooth the reporting of financial transactions. For
example, a firm that is growing and anticipates future sales will rationally increase
inventory balances. Observing an increase in inventory in this circumstance is not
due to managers manipulating earnings by not writing-off obsolete inventory.
However, the Jones model classifies such increases as earnings management. We
include a measure of future sales growth, GR_Sales, to identify this aspect of
accruals (see also McNichols, 2000). We estimate the forward-looking model as
follows:
Total Accruals ¼ aþ b1ðð1þ kÞDSales DRECÞ þ b2PPE þ b3LagTA
þ b4GR Salesþ e: ð4Þ
We measure GR_Sales as the change in sales (item 12) from the current year to next
year scaled by current sales. Note that information on GR_Sales is not available to
financial statement readers until the following year. This is not problematic when the
objective is purely to decompose accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary
components. However, for our predictive tests reported in Table 4 we use the lagged
model.
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Table 1. Analysis of various models of discretionary accruals using data from 1988–2000.




Sales-REC PPE LagTA GR_Sales Adj. R2
Modified 0.043  0.051 0.092
(8.11) (14.88)
Adapted 0.040  0.051 0.093
(8.29) (14.82)
Lagged 0.033  0.037 0.221 0.172
(6.81) (10.87) (16.58)
Fwd. Look 0.022  0.037 0.212 0.042 0.200
(4.27) (10.51) (16.35) (8.98)
Panel B: Adjusted R2 descriptives across accrual models
Distribution Statistics
Model Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3
Modified 0.092 0.153  0.004 0.060 0.147
Adapted 0.093 0.153  0.003 0.062 0.147
Lagged 0.172 0.172 0.046 0.125 0.276
Fwd. Look 0.200 0.214 0.066 0.148 0.311
Panel C: Correlations between total accruals and discretionary accrual estimatesb
Accrual Model
Model Modified Adapted Lagged Fwd. Look Total Acc.
Modified 0.999 0.951 0.931 0.849
Adapted 0.999 0.951 0.930 0.847
Lagged 0.967 0.967 0.977 0.813
Fwd. look 0.954 0.954 0.987 0.798
Total Accruals 0.926 0.924 0.894 0.882
aParameter estimates are averages from the respective 637 two-digit SIC-year regressions. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses below parameter estimates. Standard errors are based on the distribution of two-
digit SIC-year parameter estimates.
bPearson correlation coefficients are reported below the diagonal and Spearman above.
Each of the four accrual models are estimated using the Jones (1991) technique of decomposing
total accruals into a non-discretionary and a discretionary component. The method of decomposition
for each model is as follows: Modified: TA ¼ aþ b1ðDSales-DRECÞ þ b2PPE þ e; Adapted:
TA ¼ aþ b1ðð1þ kÞDSales-DRECÞ þ b2PPE þ e; Lagged: TA ¼ aþ b1ðð1þ kÞDSales-DRECÞ þ
b2PPE þ b3LagTAþ e; Forward Looking (Fwd. Look): TA ¼ aþ b1ðð1þ kÞDSales-DRECÞ þ b2PPE þ
b3LagTAþ b4GR Salesþ e: TA is the difference between operating cash flows (item 308) and income
before extraordinary items (item 123) as reported on the statement of cash flows. This variable is scaled by
average total assets (item 6).
LagTA is the lagged value of TA.
DSales is the change in sales (item 12) for the year. This variable is scaled by average total assets (item 6).
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1.2. Explanatory Power of Accrual Models
We investigate the relative explanatory power of thesemodels using all firm-years from
1988–2000 on Compustat that have the required information to calculate an estimate
of current and lagged accruals from the statement of cash flows along with estimates of
property, plant and equipment and growth in sales.3 Consistent with DeFond and
Subramanyam (1998) we exclude financial institutions from the sample (SICs between
6000 and 6999). We estimate all of our models by year for each two-digit SIC and
report mean coefficients based on 637 industry-year regressions. We require at least 10
observations in each SIC-year grouping. Themedian number of observations in a SIC-
year grouping is 36, the lower quartile is 20, and the upper quartile is 84.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the mean coefficient estimates for the parameters for
each of the models. Firm-years with total accruals or any of the independent
variables in the extreme 1% tails of their respective distributions are deleted from the
sample. The final column reports the mean explanatory power (adjusted R2) for each
of the models.
Consistent with prior research we find a positive coefficient on ðDSales-DRECÞ
and a negative coefficient on PPE for the modified Jones model. The results for the
adapted Jones model indicate only a slight improvement in explanatory power over
the modified Jones model from making the adjustment for credit sales. This is
because the coefficient on ðð1þ kÞDSales-DRECÞ is only 0.040 and so the ð1þ kÞ
adjustment to DSales only has a minimal impact on the magnitude of the residual.
The results for the lagged model indicate that about 22% of last year’s accrual
persists into the following year. The mean adjusted R2 increases from 9.2% for the
modified Jones model to 17.2% for the lagged model. Finally, including future sales
growth ðGR_SalesÞ has incremental explanatory power. The coefficient on GR_Sales
is 0.042 and the mean adjusted R2 increases to 20%, over double that of the modified
Jones model.4
Panel B of Table 1 provides additional descriptive statistics on the adjusted R2 for
each model. The forward-looking model consistently has more than double the
explanatory power of the modified Jones model in all areas of the distribution. The
R2s for the forward-looking model compare favorably to other industry-specific
models. For example Beatty et al. (2002, p. 564) report an R2 of 21% and 10%
respectively for their models of the loan loss provision and realized security gains
Table 1. Continued.
DREC is the change in receivables reported on the statement of cash flows (item 302) for the year. This
variable is scaled by average total assets (item 6).
PPE is the gross amount of property, plant and equipment (item 7). This variable is scaled by average total
assets (item 6).
GR_Sales is the change in sales for the following year. This variable is scaled by current sales.
k is calculated from the following regression for each two-digit SIC-year grouping
DREC ¼ aþ kDSalesþ e:
k is restricted to be between 0 and 1.
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and losses in the banking industry. Panel C reports the correlations between the
discretionary accrual estimates. As expected, these are all very high and are over 0.9.
Total accruals are less strongly correlated with the discretionary accrual estimates
but the correlation is still high and around 0.8.
1.3. Discretionary Component of Accruals and Ability to Detect Earnings
Management
One concern with discretionary accrual models is whether the models can detect
earnings management when it actually occurs (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995 and
McNichols, 2000). In Section 1.2 we developed the forward-looking model that
explains more of the variation in accruals than the modified Jones model. This
should improve our ability to distinguish nondiscretionary from discretionary
accruals and increase the power of our tests. In this section we provide three tests to
validate that our discretionary accrual proxy reflects earnings management.
The first test is to investigate whether the discretionary component is more
transitory than other components for predicting future earnings (e.g., Sloan, 1996,
and Xie, 2001). Table 2 provides the following base regression:
Earningstþ1 ¼ aþ bEarningst þ et: ð5Þ
We then decompose Earningst into cash from operations ðCFOÞ, nondiscretionary
accruals ðNDAÞ, and discretionary accruals ðDAÞ:
Earningstþ1 ¼ aþ b1CFOt þ b2NDAt þ b3DAt þ et: ð6Þ
We predict that the discretionary component will have a lower coefficient than other
components of earnings. The results in Table 2 indicate that for all models the
coefficient on the discretionary component is significantly lower than that on either
cash flows or the nondiscretionary component. These results suggest that more of the
transitory components of earning are reflected in our discretionary accrual measures.
The second test follows that provided by Dechow et al. (1995) and Bradshaw et al.
(2001). If discretionary accruals have power to detect earnings management, then
they should identify extreme examples of earnings management such as those
identified by the SEC in its accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs).
We use the sample of AAERs identified in Bradshaw et al. (2001) that consists of 48
AAERs all involving allegations of income increasing manipulations (see Bradshaw,
Richardson and Sloan for details on sample formation). Figure 1 provides the results
of this test. We form deciles based on the magnitude of discretionary accruals. If each
model did a perfect job at detecting the earnings management identified by the SEC,
then we would expect AAER manipulation years to be concentrated in portfolio 10.
Consistent with our models detecting earnings manipulation, the figure indicates that
a greater proportion of AAER manipulation years are in portfolio 10. We find no
significant difference between the models in detecting the earnings manipulations.
Thus, the forward-looking model explains more of the variation in accruals (as
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indicated by the R2s in Table 1) but this does not compromise its ability to detect the
earnings manipulation identified by the SEC relative to the other models.
The final test we use is to examine future earnings and stock returns. One
implication of earnings management is that it temporarily boosts earnings. If small
profit firms temporarily boost earnings to avoid a loss, then we should observe
earnings declines over the following year as accruals reverse. In addition, if
discretionary accruals are the key way of engaging in earnings management, then the
earnings declines should be concentrated in the positive discretionary accrual firms.
Further, if the market does not anticipate this decline in future earnings, then we
should observe stock price declines concentrated in the positive discretionary accrual
firms. Examining earnings declines is a stricter test of earnings management than the
persistence tests reported in Table 2 because persistence is also affected by changes in
the asset base (e.g., Fairfield et al., 2003). The result of this test is provided later in
the paper in Table 4.
2. Sample, Predictions, and Results
Section 2.1 presents our sample selection and the earnings distribution and Section
2.2 discusses our prediction. Section 2.3 provides our tests of discretionary accruals.
Section 2.4 provides a discussion of alternative explanations for the kink and Section
2.5 provides our analysis of the time-series trend of the kink.
2.1. Sample Selection of the Earnings Distribution
We obtain financial statement data from the Compustat annual database. We form
our small profit sample consistent with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997a). We scale net
income (Compustat item #172) by beginning market value of equity, MVE, (item #
25 6 item # 199), hereafter NI. We group firms into net income classes (niclass). The
range of each niclass is 0.005. For example niclass 30 includes all firm-years where
 0.15NI< 0.145. Therefore, our benchmark beater class, niclass 0, includes all
firm-years where 0NI< 0.005. We have six observations where earnings are
exactly equal to zero. Excluding these observations has no impact on the results. Our
final sample consists of 47,847 firm-years.
Figure 2 replicates the findings in Hayn (1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997a) for our sample of firms. As documented in these papers, a much greater
proportion of firms are in niclass 0 and þ 1 than in niclass  1 and  2. Niclass 0 and
þ 1 are shaded differently to emphasize that they are the focus of our tests. This
figure excludes extreme observations in the tails.5 We use two methods to gauge how
many firms are expected in niclass 0 and þ 1 by chance: a linear approximation and
an exponential approximation. To do these we estimate the slope between niclass  4
to þ 4. Using a linear (exponential) approximation, 90% (85%) of the observations
are expected to be in niclass 0 and þ 1 by chance and 10% (15%) of observations have
potentially ‘‘managed’’ earnings to avoid a loss. This is an important point to
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Table 2. Persistence of earnings components using 47,847 firm-years from 1988–2000.
Earningstþ1 ¼ bðEarningstÞ
Accrual Measure
None Total Accruals Modified Adapted Lagged Fwd. Look
Intercept  0.012  0.028  0.017  0.017  0.017  0.016
(18.64) (39.84) (16.38) (16.51) (18.47) (17.28)
Earningst 0.708
(186.88)
CFOt 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.812 0.812



















Adjusted R2 0.427 0.453 0.455 0.455 0.456 0.458
F-tests comparing relative persistence of earnings components:
Cash Flows ¼ Total Accruals 2222.49*
DA ¼ Cash Flows 2450.75* 2451.75* 2531.22* 2685.77*
NDA ¼ Cash Flows 65.79* 67.72* 97.43* 65.35*
DA ¼ NDA 220.80* 221.86* 298.43* 442.51*
T-statistics are reported in parentheses below parameter estimates.
*Indicates F-test significant at better than the 1% level.
Each of the four Accrual Models are estimated using the Jones (1991) technique of decomposing total
accruals into a non-discretionary and an discretionary component. The method of decomposition for
each model is as follows: Modified: TA ¼ aþ b1ðDSales DRECÞ þ b2PPE þ e; Adapted: TA ¼
a þ b1ðð1þ kÞDSales  DRECÞ þ b2PPE þ e; Lagged: TA ¼ aþ b1ðð1þ kÞDSales DRECÞ þ b2PPE
þb3LagTAþ e; Forward Looking (Fwd. Look): TA ¼ aþ b1ðð1þ kÞDSales DRECÞ þ b2PPE
þb3LagTAþ b4GR Salesþ e.
CFO is the operating cash flows (item 308). It is scaled by average total assets. TA is the difference between
operating cash flows (item 308) and income before extraordinary items (item 123) as reported on the
statement of cash flows. This variable is scaled by average total assets (item 6).
Earnings is income before extraordinary items (item 123) as reported on the statement of cash flows scaled
by average total assets.
LagTA is the lagged value of TA.
DSales is the change in sales (item 12) for the year. This variable is scaled by average total assets (item 6).
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consider when researchers assume that all small profit firms have managed earnings,
since approximately 85 to 90% of the observations are adding noise to such tests.
2.2. Prediction
Figure 2 indicates that there are 1646 small profit firms (firms in niclass 0 or þ1) and
797 small loss firms (firms in niclass  1 or  2). If boosting of discretionary accruals
explains the kink, then we expect firms with small profits to have higher discretionary
accruals than firms with small losses (i.e., firms boost accruals and move out of the
Table 2. Continued.
DREC is the change in receivables reported on the statement of cash flows (item 302) for the year. This
variable is scaled by average total assets (item 6).
PPE is the gross amount of property, plant and equipment (item 7). This variable is scaled by average total
assets (item 6).
GR_Sales is the change in sales for the following year. This variable is scaled by current sales.
k is calculated from the following regression for each two-digit SIC-year grouping
DREC ¼ aþ kDSalesþ e
k is restricted to be between 0 and 1.
The earnings components in the above regressions are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.
_DA represents the discretionary accruals and is the difference between Total Accruals and Non-
discretionary Accruals (NDA).
_NDA represents the nondiscretionary accruals and is computed using the coefficients from the respective
accrual model.
Figure 1. The relative frequency of earnings manipulation years identified in 48 accounting and auditing
enforcement releases (AAERs) for each decile formed on the magnitude of discretionary accruals.
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small loss class and into the small profit class). Our joint hypothesis stated in
alternative form is:
H1: The kink is caused by earnings management to avoid a loss and our discretionary
accrual proxy reflects earnings management.
Observing significantly higher discretionary accruals for the small profit group
relative to the small loss group is consistent with this hypothesis. If both groups have
similar levels of discretionary accruals then either (i) earnings management causes
the kink but our model lacks the power to detect it, or (ii) our model reflects earnings
management but the kink is not caused by earnings management.
2.3. Discretionary Accruals and the Kink
Table 3 investigates whether small profit firms are different from all other firms, and
small loss firms. Panel A of Table 3 compares small profit firms to all other firms.
Consistent with earnings management, discretionary accruals calculated using either
the forward-looking model or the lagged model are significantly higher for the small
profit group. In addition, total accruals, and operating cash flows are significantly
higher for small profit firms. Similar to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997a) we examine
the ex ante flexibility to boost accruals. The larger a firm’s current assets and
liabilities relative to its asset base, the greater the potential ability to boost earnings.
We find that small profit firms have similar levels of current assets and slightly lower
levels of current liabilities relative to other firms. In addition, we find that small
profit firms are slightly smaller, younger and less levered than other firms.
Figure 2. The distribution of net income scaled by market value (tails truncated).
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Panel B of Table 3 investigates whether discretionary accruals are higher for firms
reporting small profits relative to firms reporting small losses. This is a direct test of
whether managers boost discretionary accruals to avoid reporting a loss.
Discretionary accruals using the forward-looking model for small profit firms are
0.022 and insignificantly different from 0.017 reported for the small loss group.
Using the sample sizes, and sample variances for the small profit and small loss firms
we can determine the difference in discretionary accruals required to reject the null
(obtain a t-statistic greater than 1.96). The required difference in discretionary
accruals is 0.007. A difference of 0.007 is feasible given the difference in earnings
across the two groups of firms, since 0.007 translates to less than 1% of the asset
base. When we compare small profit firms to small loss firms we are comparing firms
whose earnings on average differ by 1% of market value. Hence, the failure to find a
difference in discretionary accruals is not due purely to low power tests.
In Panel B we also find that cash flows and total accruals are significantly higher
for the small profit group. However, this is to be expected given that there is a
positive relation between earnings, total accruals and cash flows. Consistent with
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997a), we find that small profit firms have significantly
higher current assets and liabilities. We also find that small loss firms are significantly
larger in size than small profit firms.
Panel C compares small loss firms to all other firms. The results indicate that small
loss firms have significantly higher discretionary accruals than the average firm. Small
loss and small profit firms both have high discretionary accruals relative to the
average of the entire distribution. It does not appear to be the case that the loss versus
profit distinction is important for separating the accrual behavior of the two groups.
One potential reason that we find no significant difference between the
discretionary accruals for small profit versus small loss firms is that discretionary
accruals are measured with error. In Table 4 we provide our final test to validate that
our measure of discretionary accruals detects earnings management. Table 4
examines whether small profit firms have larger earnings declines and poorer stock
price performance than other firms or small loss firms. We also examine whether the
poor performance is concentrated in the positive discretionary accrual firms.
Table 4 Panel A compares small profit firms to all other firms and indicates that
small profit firms have earnings changes of  0.038. This is significantly lower than
the earnings changes documented for other firms of 0.001. Small profit firms also
have significantly lower future returns than other firms ( 0.056 vs. 0.002).6 Panel B
decomposes small profit firms into those with positive discretionary accruals versus
zero or negative discretionary accruals (using the lagged model). The results indicate
that the poor future performance is most acute for positive discretionary accrual
firms. Firms in the small profit group with positive discretionary accruals have
earnings changes of  0.050 vs.  0.020 for all other small profit firms. Positive
discretionary accrual firms have future returns of  0.091 vs.  0.002 for other small
profit firms.
Panel C compares small loss firms to all other firms. The results indicate that small
loss firms also have significant earnings declines of  0.033 vs. 0.000 for all other
firms. Small loss firms also have negative future returns of  0.043 vs. the 0.001
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Table 3. Firm characteristics and accruals for small profit firms (net income class 0 and 1 from Figure 2)
compared to all other firms and small loss firms (net income class  1 and  2 from Figure 2).
Panel A: Methods of reporting small profits—comparison with all others
Small Profit Firms All Others
Test
Number Mean Number Mean Statistic ðp-valueÞ
Lagged Discretionary Accruals 1646 0.022 46,201 0.000 11.27 (0.001)
Fwd. Look Discretionary Accruals 1646 0.022 46,201 0.000 11.35 (0.001)
Total Accruals 1646  0.038 46,201  0.061 10.86 (0.001)
Cash Flows 1646 0.049 46,201 0.037 5.52 (0.001)
Current Assets 1639 0.370 45,821 0.371  0.15 (0.882)
Current Liabilities 1636 0.195 45,628 0.202  2.15 (0.032)
Size 1646 4.624 46,201 4.720  1.71 (0.087)
Firm Age 1483 11.97 41,515 14.39  6.90 (0.001)
Leverage 1646 0.032 46,201 0.041  1.84 (0.066)
Panel B: Methods of reporting small profits—comparison with small loss firms
Small Profit Firms Small Loss Firms
Test
Number Mean Number Mean Statistic ðp-valueÞ
Lagged Discretionary Accruals 1646 0.022 797 0.017 1.42 (0.156)
Fwd. Look Discretionary Accruals 1646 0.022 797 0.017 1.51 (0.132)
Total Accruals 1646  0.038 797  0.046 2.24 (0.025)
Cash Flows 1646 0.049 797 0.033 4.02 (0.001)
Current Assets 1639 0.370 791 0.330 4.31 (0.001)
Current Liabilities 1636 0.195 788 0.182 2.58 (0.010)
Size 1646 4.624 797 4.924  3.16 (0.002)
Firm Age 1483 11.97 722 11.45 0.88 (0.381)
Leverage 1646 0.032 797 0.029 0.34 (0.732)
Panel C: Comparison of accruals for small loss firms versus all other firms
Small Loss Firms Other Firms
Test
Number Mean Number Mean Statistic ðp-valueÞ
Lagged Discretionary Accruals 797 0.017 47,050 0.000 5.86 (0.001)
Fwd. Look Discretionary Accruals 797 0.017 47,050 0.000 4.55 (0.001)
Total Accruals 797  0.046 47,050  0.061 3.45 (0.001)
Cash Flows 797 0.033 47,050 0.037 0.58 (0.562)
Test statistic is based on a difference in means across samples ðt-testÞ with p-values reported in
parentheses.
Total Accruals (TA) is the difference between operating cash flows (item 308) and income before
extraordinary items (item 123) as reported on the statement of cash flows. This variable is scaled by
average total assets (item 6).
Fwd-Look Discretionary Accruals is the difference between Total Accruals and Non-Discretionary accruals
(NDA), where NDA are estimated using the coefficients from the following regression:
TA ¼ aþ b1ðð1þ kÞDSales DRECÞ þ b2PPE þ b3LagTAþ b4GR Salesþ e
Lagged Discretionary Accruals (DA) is the difference between Total Accruals and Non-Discretionary
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return to all other firms (but the difference is not statistically significant). Panel D
compares small loss firms to small profit firms. We find no difference in their future
performance. Panel E compares the positive discretionary accrual firms in the small
profit sample to the positive discretionary accrual firms in the small loss sample. We
find no significant difference in their future performance. Overall the results in
Table 4 are consistent with our discretionary accrual proxy detecting earnings
management. However, the results also indicate that there is no significant difference
in the extent of earnings management in the small profit and small loss firms.
We next plot discretionary accruals across the earnings distribution to see if the
increase in discretionary accruals around the kink is unusual even if it is not
statistically significant. We use the forward-looking model in all figures (results are
similar using the lagged model). Figure 3 reports the median, upper and lower
quartile of discretionary accruals for each net income class. If boosting of
discretionary accruals explains the kink, we expect firms in niclass 0 to have higher
discretionary accruals than firms in niclass  1. Contrary to this prediction, Figure 3
indicates that the upper quartile is constant, while the median and lower quartile of
discretionary accruals decrease from niclass 1 to niclass 0.7
Table 3. Continued.
Accruals (NDA), where NDA are estimated using the coefficients from the following
regression:
TA ¼ aþ b1ðð1þ kÞDSales DRECÞ þ b2PPE þ b3LagTAþ e:
We estimate this regression across 637 two-digit SIC-year groups.
Other variables used in the above regression are defined as follows:
LagTA is the lagged value of TA.
DSales is the change in sales (item 12) for the year. This variable is scaled by average total assets (item 6).
DREC is the change in receivables reported on the statement of cash flows (item 302) for the year. This
variable is scaled by average total assets (item 6).
PPE is the gross amount of property, plant and equipment (item 7). This variable is scaled by average total
assets (item 6).
GR_Sales is the change in sales for the following year. This variable is scaled by current sales.
k is calculated from the following regression for each two-digit SIC-year grouping
DREC ¼ aþ kDSalesþ e;
k is restricted to be between 0 and 1.
Current Assets are defined as the sum of accounts receivable (item 2), inventory (item 3) and other current
assets (item 68). This variable is scaled by beginning-of-the-year total assets.
Current Liabilities are defined as the sum of accounts payable (item 70), taxes payable (item 71) and other
current liabilities (item 72). This variable is scaled by beginning-of-the-year total assets.
Cash Flows is operating cash flows as reported on the Statement of Cash Flows (item 308). It is scaled by
average total assets.
Size is the log of market value of equity at the end of the year. It is calculated as stock price (item
199) * shares outstanding (item 25).
Leverage is calculated as leverage less the median leverage for the two-digit SIC-year group. Leverage is
the book value of debt (item 9þ item 34) divided by total assets (item 6).
Firm Age is the number of years for which the firm is listed on an exchange.
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Table 4. Future performance for firms reporting small profits (net income class 0 and 1 from Figure 2)
compared to all other firms and small loss firms (net income class1 and 2 from Figure 2). Discretionary
accruals (DA) are measured using the lagged model.
Panel A: Future performance for small profit firms compared to all other firms
Small Profit Firms All Other Firms
Number Value Number Value Test Statistic
DEarnings 1625  0.038 44,256 0.001  8.84 (0.001)
Future Return 1324  0.056 36,466 0.002  2.82 (0.005)






Number Value Number Value Test Statistic
DEarnings 999  0.050 626  0.020  3.51 (0.001)
Future Return 808  0.091 516  0.002  2.03 (0.043)
Panel C: Future performance of small loss firms compared to all other firms
Small Loss Firms All Other Firms
Number Value Number Value Test Statistic
DEarnings 787  0.033 45,094 0.000  5.54 (0.001)
Future Return 606  0.043 37,184 0.001  1.22 (0.223)
Panel D: Future performance for small profit firms compared to small loss firms
Small Profit Firms Small Loss Firms
Number Value Number Value Test Statistic
DEarnings 1625  0.038 787  0.033  0.83 (0.408)
Future Return 1324  0.056 606  0.043  0.33 (0.739)
Panel E: Future performance of positive discretionary accrual small profit firms compared to positive





Number Value Number Value Test Statistic
DEarnings 999  0.050 481  0.040  1.05 (0.294)
Future Return 808  0.091 364  0.052  0.78 (0.434)
Test statistic is based on a difference in means across samples ðt-testÞ with p-values reported in
parentheses.
DEarnings is the change in net income (item 172) over the following year. Net income is scaled by opening
market value of equity.
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We also note that despite our effort to control for performance, there is still a
positive relation between earnings and discretionary accruals for extreme loss firms.8
This relation has been noted by prior research (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995). This
Figure 3. Discretionary accruals measured using the forward-looking model across net income classes.
Table 4. Continued.
Future Return is one-year-ahead market adjusted returns. Returns are calculated starting four months after
the end of the fiscal year. For example, company XYZ has a December 31, 1995 fiscal year end. We
calculate net income and accrual information for the fiscal year ended 1995. Our return window is from
April 1, 1996 to March 31, 1997.
The discretionary accrual breakdown is based on our Lagged model. Using this model Discretionary
Accruals (DA) is the difference between Total Accruals and Non-discretionary accruals (NDA). Total
Accruals (TA) is the difference between operating cash flows (item 308) and income before extraordinary
items (item 123) as reported on the statement of cash flows. This variable is scaled by average total assets
(item 6). NDA are estimated using the coefficients from the following regression:
TA ¼ aþ b1ðð1þ kÞDSales  DRECÞ þ b2PPE þ b3LagTA:
We estimate this regression across 637 two-digit SIC-year groups.
Other variables used in the above regression are defined as follows:
LagTA is the lagged value of TA.
DSales is the change in sales (item 12) for the year. This variable is scaled by average total assets (item 6).
DREC is the change in receivables reported on the statement of cash flows (item 302) for the year. This
variable is scaled by average total assets (item 6).
PPE is the gross amount of property, plant and equipment (item 7). This variable is scaled by average total
assets (item 6).
k is calculated from the following regression for each two-digit SIC-year grouping
DREC ¼ aþ kDSales þ e;
k is restricted to be between 0 and 1.
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suggests that our results in Table 3 Panel A comparing small profit firms to all other
firms are biased in favor of finding positive discretionary accruals.
One explanation for our lack of findings in Table 3 Panel B is that a greater
proportion of firms in the small profit group manage earnings, even though the mean
level of discretionary accrual is not significantly different from the small loss group.
Figure 4 reports the proportion of firms in each niclass that have positive
discretionary accruals. If discretionary accrual behavior occurs randomly, we expect
each niclass to have a ratio equal to 0.50. Figure 4 indicates that approximately 61%
of firms in niclass 0 and 63% of firms in niclass 1 have positive discretionary
accruals. Under an earnings management explanation for the kink we would expect a
greater proportion in niclass 0, not niclass 1. Figure 4 also shows a positive relation
between the proportion of discretionary accruals and the level of earnings,
particularly in the loss region, again suggesting that our model reduces but does
not eliminate the positive relation between earnings and discretionary accruals.
Figure 5 provides another test of whether discretionary accruals explain the kink.
The loss avoidance story is directional, in the sense that firms boost discretionary
accruals to move from reporting a loss to a profit. We therefore expect the kink to be
less obvious in the distribution of firms with negative discretionary accruals. Figure 5
indicates that the kink is still obvious for firms with negative discretionary accruals.
In Figure 2, the ratio of niclass 0 to niclass  1 is 2.30 (845/368), in Figure 5 this ratio
is 2.45 (331/135). Thus, the kink increases when we exclude positive discretionary
accrual firms from the earnings distribution. This is not predicted under a simple loss
avoidance story.
An alternative research design to identify the impact of earnings management on
the earnings distribution is to examine the pre-managed earnings distribution. To
calculate pre-managed net income we subtract discretionary accruals from net
income (scaled by average total assets). We then group firms into pre-managed net
Figure 4. Proportion of positive discretionary accrual firms in each net income class. Discretionary
accruals are measured using the forward-looking model.
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income classes in the same manner as done in Figure 2. Figure 6(a) documents this
distribution.
There is no observable kink in Figure 6(a). This is consistent with earnings
management causing the kink in the earnings distribution. However, when we subtract
a random number drawn from a normal distribution with the same mean (zero) and
variance (0.01155) as ourmeasure of discretionary accruals we obtain a similar smooth
‘‘pre-managed’’ distribution. Figure 6(b) documents the pre-managed distribution
using the random number in place of our estimate of discretionary accruals.
The ‘‘pre-managed’’ earnings research design has a simple problem. By deducting a
number from net income (whether it be a random number or otherwise), the result is
an ‘‘unmixing’’ of two distributions. As shown in Figure 6(b) this generates a smooth
‘‘pre-managed’’ net income distribution. This research design has the potential to
falsely reject the null hypothesis of no earnings management. Finding a smooth pre-
managed net income distribution is a necessary condition for documenting an
earnings management explanation for the kink, but it is not a sufficient condition.9
The overall takeaway from our tests of earnings management is that small profit
and small loss firms have similar levels of discretionary accruals and a similar
proportion of positive discretionary accrual firms. Therefore, we are unable to
explain the kink with the story that firms boost earnings to move from reporting a
small loss to reporting a small profit.
2.4. Alternative Explanations for the Kink
In this section we provide a discussion of some non-earnings management
explanations for the kink.
Figure 5. The distribution of net income scaled by market value for firm-years with income decreasing
discretionary accruals (using the forward-looking model).
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2.4.1. Management Taking Real Actions to Improve Performance
One of the objectives of a firm is to produce a profit. Managers could set targets and
employees could work harder when there is a clearly defined objective (i.e., to be
profitable). When firms are ranked on earnings, we can observe the effect of this
incentive in the data at the zero earnings reference point. The kink could be reflecting
efficient contracting. The first-order effect of setting a target is people work harder to
achieve the target. The second-order effect is earnings management.
Figure 6. (a) Distribution of pre-managed net income. Pre-managed net income is calculated as net income
scaled by average total assets less discretionary accruals measured using the forward-looking model.
(b) Distribution of pre-managed net income. Pre-managed net income is calculated as net income scaled by
average total assets less a random number drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero, variance
0.01155.
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2.4.2. Selection Bias Due to Exchange Listing Requirements
Stock exchanges often have a stated preference for listing profitable firms. For
example, the New York Stock Exchange requires firms to have $2.5 million in profits
in the listing year or have $6.5 million in profits over the previous three years and a
market value of at least $60 million. The American Stock Exchange requires
$750,000 in the latest fiscal year or two of the most recent three years and a market
value of $15 million. The NASDAQ Stock Market requires pretax income of $1
million in the latest fiscal year or two of the last three fiscal years and a market value
of $8 million.
Figure 7(a) provides a plot for firms that have been listed on an exchange for two
years or less. Consistent with a listing bias, the kink is more extreme for newly listed
firms. Figure 7(b) presents a plot of firms that are over twenty years of age. A smaller
kink is observable for these firms, but the kink is still there. This suggests that
exchange-listing requirements provide a partial but not complete explanation for the
kink.
2.4.3. Scaling by Market Value
Investors could use different valuation approaches for loss versus profit firms (e.g.,
Hayn, 1995). For example, investors could place more weight on the balance sheet
and liquidation values when a firm reports a loss (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev,
1997b). This could in turn affect the denominator (market value) used to create the
distribution of earnings presented in Figure 2. The results in Table 3 indicate that
small loss firms have significantly higher market values than small profit firms. This
is consistent with different valuation methods being applied to profit versus loss
firms. Perhaps the kink just indicates that there are more high price-earnings ratio
firms than one would expect by chance.
We provide two figures to investigate whether scaling affects the kink in earnings.
Figure 8 reports earnings-per-share (Compustat data item 58) and Figure 9(a)
reports unscaled earnings in $100,000 increments. What is noticeable in both figures
is that the distribution changes in shape to be more bell-like, with the mode being at
zero. This makes interpretation of the kink more difficult since it is unclear what
number to expect at the peak of the distribution.
Figure 8 indicates that scaling earnings by the number of shares outstanding
considerably mitigates the kink. For example, the ratio of firms with EPS of 0 cents
to firms with EPS of 1 cent is 1.18 (804/682), and the ratio of firms with EPS of +1
cent to EPS of 1 cent is 1.11 (762/682). Thus the kink at zero does not appear to be
too unusual. In fact, larger kinks are observable at other points such as 39 versus 40
cents, 79 versus 80 cents, and 99 cents versus $1.00. However, these other kinks are
not due to loss avoidance. The preponderance of observations at cents ending in zero
in the profit region is discussed in Thomas (1989) and Carslaw (1988).
Figure 9(a) (examining earnings in $100,000 increments) provides evidence of a
kink. The ratio of dollar net income class 0 firms to dollar net income class  1 firms is
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1.81 (1189/654). In Figure 2, the ratio of niclass 0 to niclass  1 is 2.30 (845/368).
Thus, even though the kink looks quite extreme in Figure 9(a) it is smaller than that
presented in Figure 2.10 Although not easily discernible in Figure 9(a), we find that
similar to the EPS distribution, there are also ‘‘kinks’’ just above earnings numbers
ending with zero, such as 1 million, 2 million, 3 million, etc.
Figure 9(b) reports the distribution of cash from operations in $100,000
increments. What is noticeable here is that the mode is now in the group with
Figure 7. (a) The distribution of net income scaled by market value for firms listed for two years or less
(4454 firm-years). (b) The distribution of net income scaled by market value for firms listed for more than
twenty years (9016 firm-years).
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slightly negative cash from operations (i.e., CFO class  1). The figure also indicates
a ‘‘kink’’ on either side of the mode. This highlights the difficulty in interpreting the
kink at the mode. We next investigate whether the 1189 small profit firms in
Figure 9(a) are clustered in CFO class  1. This would be consistent with small profit
firms using accruals to move from a cash flow loss to a profit and would also explain
the differences in the kinks we observe in Figure 9(a) and 9(b). Figure 9(c) reports the
distribution of cash from operations for the 1189 firms. What is noticeable in
Figure 9(c) is the preponderance of firms in CFO class 0. We find that the mean and
median cash from operations for the 1189 firms are positive. Therefore the difference
in the kinks in Figures 9(a) and 9(b) is not explained by a simple story that firms use
accruals to move from CFO class 1 into dollar net income class 0.
In summary, Figures 8 and 9 suggest that scaling by market value alters the shape
of the earnings distribution. When the mode is at zero it is much more difficult to
evaluate whether the ‘‘kink’’ is unusual. Figures 8 and 9 suggest that scaling by
market value emphasizes the kink around zero.
2.4.4. Accounting Rules and Conservatism
Another reason a kink could be observed in earnings is because of accounting rules
that encourage immediate loss recognition but prorate gain recognition. An example
of this is asset impairment tests. If a firm purchases an asset that is expected to earn a
high return, this gain is not recognized immediately, but instead is recognized as
earned over the life of the asset. However, if the same firm purchases an asset that is
Figure 8. Distribution of earnings-per-share (tails truncated). There are 804 firms reporting EPS between 0
and 1 cent, and 682 firms reporting EPS less than 0 but greater than 1 cent.
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not productive (i.e., will result in small future losses over its life), the firm is required
to recognize the full extent of the losses immediately. Similarly, the lower of cost or
market rule for inventory results in prorating profits but immediate recognition of
future losses. The effect of these asymmetric accounting treatments is to shift
potential small loss firms to the left tail of the distribution and profitable firms to the
small profit region. We provide no formal tests of this explanation.
Figure 9(a). The distribution of net income in $100,000 class intervals (tails truncated). There are 1189
observations with net income between 0 and $100,000 and 654 with income between $100,000 and 0.
Figure 9(b). The distribution of cash from operations in $100,000 class intervals (tails truncated). There
are 1051 observations with cash from operations between 0 and $100,000 and 1115 observations with cash
from operations between $100,000 and 0.
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2.4.5. Financial Assets
The presence of financial assets on the balance sheet could contribute to a
concentrated mass of small profit firms. Financial assets earn dividends or interest,
neither of which can be negative. Adding the distribution of returns to financial
assets to the distribution of returns generated by net operating assets could induce a
kink in earnings.
2.5. Has the Earnings Kink Changed Through Time?
There has been a general shift away from focusing on bottom-line earnings in recent
years. For example the listing requirements for the New York Stock Exchange have
changed to de-emphasize the focus on earnings. Prior to 1995, the NYSE had a
strong focus on positive income as a pre-requisite for listing on the exchange. In
1995, the NYSE allowed firms to list with losses as long as revenues, market
capitalization and operating cash flows exceeded certain thresholds. In 1999, the
NYSE allowed firms to list solely on the basis of reported revenues and market
capitalization. This shift away from an ‘‘income’’ focus has had a dramatic effect on
the distribution of net income for NYSE firms. In unreported tests we find that the
ratio of small profit to small loss firms for NYSE firms for the entire 1988–2000
period is 2.13. Prior to the listing requirement change at the end of 1995, the ratio
was 2.68 and after the change the ratio dropped to 1.76.
A decline in the earnings kink could also occur if management placed more
emphasis on meeting analysts’ forecasts. Firms often set internal budgets and targets
Figure 9(c). The distribution of cash flows from operations in $100,000 class intervals for the 1189
observations with net income between 0 and $100,000.
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and then provide guidance to analysts on these numbers. Empirical evidence suggests
that the tendency to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts has increased in recent years
(e.g., Burgstahler and Eames, 1998; Brown, 2001; DeGeorge et al. 1999).
Alternatively, with the advent of ‘‘pro forma earnings,’’ managers now have more
flexibility to report a ‘‘street earnings’’ number they desire without concern for the
level of GAAP earnings (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002).
Table 5 indicates that the proportion of small profit firms (niclass 0 and þ 1) to
small loss firms (niclass  1 and  2) has declined over time and the regression results
show a significant decline in the kink. In addition, the earnings per share change
ratio has declined substantially. The results also indicate that the ratio of firms
meeting or just beating analyst forecasts has considerably strengthened in recent
years.
Table 5. A temporal examination of three earnings thresholds: reporting positive earnings, reporting
earnings that exceed last year’s earnings, and reporting earnings that exceed analyst expectations.
Panel A: Trends in the relative importance of the three earnings thresholds over the 1989–2001
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Trend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
RATIOEARNINGS 2.09 2.78 4.26 2.85 2.79 2.34 1.79 1.66 2.27 2.09 1.68 1.31 n/a
RATIODEPS n/a 2.06 1.83 2.12 1.56 1.68 1.67 1.30 1.36 1.42 1.14 1.24 1.05
RATIOANALYSTS 1.21 1.21 1.05 1.13 1.09 1.50 1.58 1.58 1.94 1.90 1.98 1.88 1.98
Panel B: Regression of the three ratio measures over 1989–2001 on time trend
RATIO ¼ aþ bTrend þ e
Earnings Threshold   Adjusted R2















T-statistics are reported in parentheses below parameter estimates.
RATIOEARNINGS is calculated each year as the number of small profit firms (classes 0 and 1) divided by
the number of small loss firms (classes 2 and 1) using data from Compustat.
RATIODEPS is calculated each year as the number of small positive changes in reported EPS (DEPS is
positive 1 or 2 cents) divided by the number of small negative changes in reported EPS (DEPS is negative 1
or 2 cents). This ratio is calculated using EPS figures as reported on I/B/E/S (after correcting for the split
adjustment issue documented in Baber and Kang, 2002).
RATIOANALYSTS is calculated each year as the number of small positive forecast errors (i.e., where
reported EPS exceeds the most recent consensus forecast by 1 or 2 cents) divided by the number of small
negative forecast errors (i.e., where reported EPS falls short of the most recent consensus forecast by 1 or 2
cents). This measure is calculated in the same way as Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003, Table 8).
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3. Summary and Conclusion
We investigate whether the boosting of discretionary accruals explains the ‘‘kink’’ in
the earnings distribution identified by Hayn (1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997a). The ‘‘earnings management to avoid a loss’’ explanation for the kink
predicts that firms with small (premanaged) losses boost earnings to report a profit.
This results in fewer firms than expected in the small loss group and more firms than
expected in the small profit group. One implication of this story is that small profit
firms will have higher discretionary accruals than small loss firms. In addition, the
earnings management explanation is directional: small loss firms manage earnings up
to report a small profit. Therefore, another implication is that after removing from
the earnings distribution firms that have positive discretionary accruals, one should
see the kink decline.
Our results testing these implications are not compelling. We find that small profit
and small loss firms have similar levels of discretionary accruals and both groups
have similar proportions of positive discretionary accrual firms. In addition, the kink
increases when we examine the distribution of earnings for negative discretionary
accrual firms.
One explanation for our lack of results is that earnings management explains the
kink but our tests lack power. To mitigate this concern, we provide a multitude of
tests examining the power of our model. Another possibility is that we are measuring
discretionary accruals correctly, but that the earnings management story is more
complex than the one we test. For example, perhaps small loss firms boost earnings
in the first three quarters, but in the fourth quarter their auditors do not allow some
vital adjustments. This would suggest that the actions of auditors, rather than
earnings management, explains the kink. We leave the examination of more complex
earnings management stories to future research.
Ultimately, the importance of our finding of no significant difference in
discretionary accruals between small profit and small loss firms comes down to the
reader’s priors on the cause of the kink. If the reader’s null hypothesis is that the
kink is caused by earnings management, then our results have little impact on this
maintained hypothesis. Instead, they suggest that researchers should be wary of
using Jones-type discretionary accrual models. If the reader’s null hypothesis is that
the cause of the kink is unknown, then our inability to reject the null in favor of
earnings management leaves open the question of what causes the kink.
We discuss five non-earnings management explanations for the kink in earnings.
These include: (i) managers taking real actions to improve performance; (ii)
exchange listing preferences for profitable firms; (iii) the possibility that the kink is
driven by the denominator (market value) rather than the numerator (earnings) due
to investors applying different valuation methods to loss versus profit firms; (iv) the
role of accounting rules and conservatism; and (v) the role of financial assets. We do
not test all of these explanations, but our tests of (ii) and (iii) suggest that selection
biases play a partial role and that scaling issues influence the magnitude of the kink.
We suggest researchers proceed with caution when using the ratio of small profit
to small loss firms as a measure of earnings management. First, it is not clear what
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this ratio should be in the absence of earnings management. This problem was
accentuated when we examined the EPS and unscaled earnings distribution. In these
distributions, small profits are the mode and it is unclear how large the mode should
be. Second, if managers take real actions to improve performance or there are
selection biases in favor of small profit firms, then the use of this ratio could be noisy
or biased. Third, small profit and loss firms differ from firms in the general
population on a number of dimensions and so this raises concerns about potential
correlated omitted variables. Fourth, our results suggest that the kink has declined
over time. Finally, since we find that small loss firms also appear to be managing
earnings, this brings into question whether loss avoidance is the primary motivation
for the accrual management we detect in small profit firms. Contracts such as bonus
plans that are conditional on earnings could create incentives for firms with small
earnings (either positive or negative) to engage in income-increasing earnings
management (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 208).
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Notes
1. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997a) received the American Accounting Association Notable Contribu-
tions to Accounting Literature Award in 2002 for their work.
2. There are 52 (out of 637) instances where the slope estimate is negative. These estimates are re-coded
as zero.
3. The main reason we restrict our sample to post-1987 data is so that we can consistently measure our
cash flow and accruals using data from the statement of cash flows. Collins and Hribar (2002) suggest
that more accurate and less biased estimates of accruals are obtained from the statement of cash flows.
4. Prior research has frequently scaled the intercept in the Jones model by lagged assets. We did not
adopt this approach for two reasons. First, allowing the intercept to vary with the magnitude of lagged
asset is essentially a control for heteroskedasticity (the magnitude of discretionary accruals is a
function of firm size). Heteroskedasticity affects the standard error but does not bias coefficient
estimates. We do not use the standard errors obtained from the industry-year regressions but instead
calculate standard errors based on the distribution of the 637 industry-year coefficient estimates.
Second, we are interested in comparing the explanatory power of the models. Scaling the intercept by
lagged assets is essentially the same thing as running a regression with no intercept and so the resulting
R2s are no longer meaningful (Greene, 1997, p. 255).
5. The number of observations for niclass > 30 is 3649 and for niclass < 30 is 6925. The tails have been
excluded for graphical representation only. All observations are used in our statistical tests.
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6. Data on stock returns are obtained from the CRSP daily stock return files. We use compounded buy-
hold returns, inclusive of dividends and other distributions obtained from CRSP. Market-adjusted
returns are calculated by deducting the corresponding return on an equal-weighted market portfolio.
Return results are robust to alternative specifications including size-adjusted returns and value-
weighted returns. Future returns are cumulated over a one-year period beginning four months after
the fiscal year-end. There are 37,790 firm-years available with Compustat and CRSP data.
7. In unreported tests we examine whether specific accruals such as deferred tax expense (Compustat
item 50 deflated by the lagged assets) is used to avoid a loss (e.g., Phillips et al. 2003). We find no
significant difference in deferred tax expense for small loss versus small profit firms. Our results are
consistent with Bauman et al. (2001, p. 38) who find no significant evidence that the deferred tax asset
valuation account is used to avoid losses. These results are available from the authors upon request.
8. In unreported tests, we find this relation even when we back-out negative special items that are
included in our measures of discretionary accruals. It is possible that extreme loss firms are taking
discretionary ‘‘earnings baths.’’ However, the alternative explanation is that we are including
nondiscretionary negative accruals in our discretionary accrual measure for these firms.
9. Our test examining the net income distribution, after excluding firms with positive discretionary
accruals, does not suffer from a tendency to falsely reject the null (see Figure 5). Instead, this test could
suffer from low power. The kink is still observed when firms are randomly selected from Compustat.
To the extent that our measure of discretionary accruals is random we could still end up observing the
kink in Figure 5.
10. In unreported tests we examine the kink for earnings increments of $50,000 and $10,000. We find that
the kink increases as we decrease the size of the dollar increment. For example, 180 firms report profits
less than $10,000, while 39 firms report losses greater then $10,000. We report $100,000 increments
because it produces a similar number of observations in net income class 0 to that reported in Figure 2.
In addition, at the $10,000 level the earnings distribution is flat and has many ‘‘kinks’’ which makes
interpretation difficult.
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